THE ETHICS OF REPRESENTING DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY

this purpose); In re Olcese, 86 B.R. 916 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988)(court deemed facts alleged in affidavit to be true, but considered other facts apparent in record of case at hearing on disqualification); In re Norton, 119 B.R. 332 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990)(court considered motion, briefs, affidavit of judge, testimony of debtor and judge's former law partner, record of adversary proceeding and entire case); In re Krisle, 54

B.R. 330 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1985)(evidentiary hearing); In re Apex Oil Co., 23 BCD 1069, 1992 WL 322032 (8th Cir. 1992)(court considered movant's affidavit as true, but also considered facts known by judge). ⁵⁴⁵ See extensive citations and discussion of caselaw in In re Jeffrey Grossman, 147 B.R. 903 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992); other bankruptcy cases include: American Ready Mix, Inc. v. Lopez, 14 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1994); In re Chandler's Cove Inn, Ltd., 74 B.R. 772 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Krisle, 54 B.R. 330 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1985); In re Olcese, supra; In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 84 B.R. 129 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988)(appearance of bias must be based on extra-judicial activities); Matter of Pritchard & Baird, Inc., 16 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1981). The Ninth Circuit applied this principle in In re Manoa Finance Co., Inc., 781 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1986), but cautioned that because bankruptcy judges retain an administrative role in bankruptcy cases, although less under the Bankruptcy Code than the prior Act, bankruptcy judges should "be especially solicitous in maintaining both the appearance and reality of impartiality when adjudicating matters with which they have had close involvement, erring on the side of recusing themselves when appropriate." 781 F.2d at 1373. See In re Alpern, 246 B.R. 578 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000)(no recusal for refusal to respond after hearing concluded).

⁵⁴⁶ In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 84 B.R. 129, 132 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988)(discussing circuit court non-bankruptcy cases, and concluding that "[a]n apparent antagonism towards an attorney must be of such character and apparent intensity to warrant a reasonable belief that the judge might, 921 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1991) (judge acknowledged prejudice from what he considered a personal affront by counsel).