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S 727(a)(8) is [not] a statute of limitations . . . S 727(a)(8) imposes no limitation period. 'A statute of limitation requires a litigant to file a claim within a specified period of time.' Section 727(a)(8) does not 'require[ ] a litigant'--here, Tidewater--'to file [its] claim within a specified period of time.' Instead, S 727(a)(8) conditions the ability of a debtor, . . . , to obtain a Chapter 7 discharge, by requiring her to wait six years after initiating earlier proceedings that ended in a discharge. Thus, as the bankruptcy court explained, S 727(a)(8) 'does not define a limitations period for [], a creditor, to assert its claim,' rather it 'defines a condition that the Debtor . . . was required to satisfy in order to qualify for a benefit, namely, a discharge of her debts.' . . . Not only limitations periods, but all statutory periods to which courts have applied equitable tolling principles, contain these same two characteristics. First, they provide a plaintiff (in the bankruptcy context, a creditor) with a specified period of time within which the plaintiff must act to pursue a claim in order to preserve a remedy. Second, such periods commence when the plaintiff has (or discovers that he has) a 'complete and present cause of action.' When these two circumstances exist, a court will often toll a period if it concludes that equitable considerations excuse a plaintiff's failure to take the required action within the time period. In stark contrast, the provision at issue here, S 727(a)(8), does not contain either of these critical characteristics. First, it does not 'prescribe[ ] a period [of time] within which [a] certain right[ ]' may 'be enforced' by the claimant[.] Instead, S 727(a)(8) prescribes a period of time a debtor must wait before becoming eligible for a discharge. Second, the six-year period in S 727(a)(8) does not 'commence[ ] when the claimant [Tidewater] ha[d] a complete and present cause of action.' Rather, the six-year period commences when the debtor initiates a bankruptcy proceeding that led to a prior discharge, which may be, as here, well before the claimant had 'a complete and present cause of action.'").
E. 11 U.S.C. S 727(a)(11): ". . . the debtor failed to complete an instructional course concerning personal financial management. . ."
Lauro v. Shearer (In re Lauro), No. 07-670, 2007 WL 4180683 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2007) (The failure to file a statement regarding completion of the post-petition instructional course within 45 days required by Interim Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c) is subject to excusable neglect analysis. Bankruptcy court inappropriately denied discharge under S 727(a)(11) and closed the case without considering whether the debtor's confusion about the 45-day requirement constituted excusable neglect. Debtors filed Chapter 7 on February 20, 2006, and completed post-petition instructional course on June 12, 2006. The statement of completion was filed on June 22 - approximately two months after the 45-day deadline imposed by Interim Rule 1007(c). On November 2, 2006, the bankruptcy court, pursuant to S 727(a)(11), denied discharge and closed the case. Debtors moved to reopen arguing excusable neglect because they mistakenly believed they had six months to complete the instructional course and file the statement. "Here, the [debtors] completed the postpetition course in financial management and filed their certificate of completion almost five months prior to the closure of their bankruptcy case. It is acknowledged that the [debtors] untimely filed the certificate of completion. The failure to adhere to the forty-five-day period for completion of the course and the filing of the certificate of completion was explained as resulting from the inaccuracy of independent internet research conducted by the [debtors], the failure of the [debtors'] counsel to advise them about the applicable time period and the lack of notice of the relevant time period in the
