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Court in no way disturbed the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to hear certain matters, which is a separate issue from the court's power to enter a final judgment." In short, the court found that Granite's reliance on Stern was misplaced, "as the jurisdictional inquiry is separate from the core/ non-core inquiry that the Supreme Court considered in Stern." Next, the court examined whether it had "related to" jurisdiction over the trustee's suit considering the post-confirmation status of the case. The court noted that "in the post-confirmation context, the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is somewhat narrower than in the pre-confirmation context." Nonetheless, the court, after discussing and distinguishing the Third Circuit case Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co. LLP (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 372 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2004), found that because the trustee's suit here had arisen and been filed (initially by the debtor) pre-confirmation (unlike Resorts), and because the debtor's plan specifically contemplated the continuation of this litigation, the bankruptcy court had "relate to" jurisdiction over the suit. In reaching this conclusion, the court applied the Pacor test for pre-confirmation "related to" jurisdiction rather than the post-confirmation "close nexus" test. The court did find, however, that even under the stricter "close nexus" test, it had at least related to jurisdiction over the suit. Said the court: "The Plan and Confirmation Order specifically provide for the retention of any pending causes of action commenced by Debtors and any actions against customers. The prosecution of these claims is clearly mentioned as a means of implementation [of the plan], and thus unlike the malpractice claim in Resorts, the action at hand is not a 'matter[ ] collateral to the bankruptcy process.'" Finally, the court addressed Granite's argument that because Granite had demanded a jury trial, the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction. The court stated: "Whether Defendant is entitled to a jury trial has no bearing on this Court's subject matter jurisdiction and thus is irrelevant at this stage of the proceeding. Further, the proper mechanism to address this issue is through a motion to withdraw the reference."
i. Parmalat Capital Finance Ltd. v. Bank of America Corp., 671 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2012)
Issue: Whether the district court properly refused to mandatorily abstain from deciding the suits initiated by the debtor and the debtor's subsidiary in Illinois state court.
Holding: The Court vacated the judgments of the district court and remanded the cases with instructions that they be transferred to the Northern District of Illinois and remanded to the Illinois state court. The only issue before the Court was whether the Illinois suits could be timely adjudicated in state court, thus warranting mandatory abstention. The court reiterated: "In our previous Opinion, we explained that "[f]our factors come into play in evaluating § 1334(c)(2) timeliness: (1) the backlog of the state court's calendar relative to the federal court's calendar; (2) the complexity of the issues presented and the respective expertise of each forum; (3) the status of the title 11 bankruptcy proceeding to which the state law claims are related; and (4) whether the state court proceeding would prolong the administration or liquidation of the estate." The court then examined each of these factors. "With regard to the first factor, 'the backlog of the
©2014 William L. Norton III
