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address the bankruptcy court's authority to enter final judgments under Article I, stating "[j] urisdiction retention language from a Plan, by itself, does not confer upon a bankruptcy court authority to enter final orders." In short, the court found that Article III claims (over which the bankruptcy court lacked final adjudicative authority) predominated. Lastly, the court examined the remaining Orion factors to determine whether the reference should be withdrawn. The court found that it would be inefficient to withdraw the reference at this time and that none of the other Orion factors (jury rights, forum shopping and uniformity of bankruptcy administration) weighed in favor of withdrawing the reference. Thus, the court concluded that the reference should not be withdrawn at this time. The court denied the defendants' motions without prejudice to their re- filing such motions when the case was ready for trial.
i. In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2012)
Issue and Holding: Section 1123(a)(5)(B) pre-empted anti-assignment provisions in debtor's insurance policies to the extent the provisions prohibited transfer to a § 524(g) trust.
ii. Quigley Company, Inc. v. Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos (In re Quigley Company, Inc.), 676 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2012)
Issue: The scope of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over suits against non-debtor third parties, and the scope of a stay issued pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4).
Holding: The Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The court first found that the bankruptcy court's clarifying order was equivalent to a decision from that court on a motion seeking relief from the stay, and thus constituted a final appealable order. The court then addressed the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to issue the clarifying order in the first place. The court rejected Angelos' argument that Stern v. Marshall precluded the bankruptcy court from enjoining these third parties and that jurisdiction was also lacking under the Code. Regarding the Article III argument, the court found that Stern simply did not apply here-the facts were far removed from this case and the Stern holding was narrow. The court noted that "[e]njoining litigation to protect bankruptcy estates during the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings, unlike the entry of the final tort judgment at issue in Stern, has historically been the province of the bankruptcy courts." Regarding the statutory jurisdiction argument, the court concluded that the Angelos suits "could directly affect Quigley's bankruptcy estate, and bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 is appropriate." The court noted that unlike the situation in Pacor, "[h] ere, Pfizer need not rely on a separate action for indemnification; rather, it has a now-existent legal right to utilize the assets of the Insurance Policies and Insurance Trust to satisfy judgments or settlements or pay defense costs." Next, the court rejected Angelos' argument that under the Second Circuit's decision in Manville, "the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to enjoin the Angelos suits because they allege violations of an independent legal duty owed by Pfizer to
©2014 William L. Norton III
